Loyola University Chicago, School of Law

LAW eCommons
Faculty Publications & Other Works

2016

Informed Consent as Compelled Professional
Speech: Fictions, Facts, and Open Questions
Nadia N. Sawicki
Loyola University Chicago, School of Law, nsawicki@luc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/facpubs
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Medical Jurisprudence Commons
Recommended Citation
Nadia N. Sawicki, Informed Consent as Compelled Professional Speech: Fictions, Facts, and Open Questions, 50 WASH. U. J. L. &
POL'Y 11 (2016).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications & Other Works
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

Informed Consent as Compelled Professional Speech:
Fictions, Facts, and Open Questions
Nadia N. Sawicki*
Until recently, First Amendment jurisprudence was not considered
particularly relevant to the context of physician-patient
communication. As explained by First Amendment Scholar Robert
Post, physicians regularly face liability on the basis of what they say
or fail to say, "[w]ithout so much as a nod to the First Amendment
''I

In the past few years, however, legislative efforts to define the
contours of informed consent in the provision of abortion services
have brought increased attention to the First Amendment's role in
medical practice. Many states have enacted statutes requiring
physicians to provide women seeking abortions with specific
information beyond the bounds of what would be required under
common law-that having an abortion increases the risk of breast
cancer, infertility, and suicide; 2 that medical abortion may be
* Associate Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, Beazley Institute for
Health Law and Policy. An early draft of this article was presented at the American Society for
Law, Medicine, and Ethics' June 2015 Health Law Professors Conference, as part of a panel
thoughtfully coordinated by Elizabeth Sepper. Many thanks to colleagues who offered feedback
and suggestions on earlier drafts, including Claudia Haupt, Jessie Hill, Helen Norton, and
Robert Post. My thanks also go out to the invaluable research assistance of Loyola Law student
Xavier Vergara.
1. Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of
Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 939, 950 (2007).
2. See State Policies in Brief: Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion,

GUTTMACHER INST. (July 1, 2015), https://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib
MWPA.pdf (citing laws requiring disclosure of links between abortion and breast cancer,
infertility, and psychological harm); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(e)(ii) (2015)
(requiring disclosure of "[i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and suicide"), upheld by Planned
Parenthood of Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008). Many researchers
dispute the validity of these required disclosures. See Nadia N. Sawicki, The Abortion Informed
Consent Debate: More Light, Less Heat, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 12-13 (2011).
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reversed; 3 that a fetus is a unique human being with whom the
woman enjoys a constitutionally protected relationship;4 and visual
descriptions of the fetus as displayed on an ultrasound.5 Beyond the
abortion context, new laws regulating physician speech on topics
such as gun ownership,6 sexual orientation change efforts, medical
marijuana,8 and physician aid-in-dying 9 raise similar questions about
the constitutional limits of state control over physician-patient
communication. These laws call attention to the fact that physicians
frequently engage in significant communicative activities.1 0
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has provided only limited
guidance on the intersection between physician speech and the First

3.

ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2153(A)(2)(h)-(i) (2015); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-

1703(b)(1)(G) (2015). Most doctors agree that the science behind the abortion -reversal claim is
erroneous. See Rick Rojas, Arizona Orders Doctors to Say Abortions With Drugs May Be

Reversible, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2015, at All (quoting the chairwoman of the Arizona section
of the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, who described the claim that
medical abortion can be reversed as having "no data behind it, absolutely no science to show
that this is an effective method").

4. S.D. CODiFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(b); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02 (2015);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709(b)(5), 65-6710 (2015).
5. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.2(D)(2)(b) (2008) (amended 2013); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-21.85(a) (2011), held unconstitutionalby Stuart v. Canmitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir.
2014); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d(B) (2010), held unconstitutionalby Nova Health Sys. v.
Pruitt, 292 P.3d 28 (Okla. 2012); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4) (West
2011), preliminary injunction vacated by Tex. Med. Provs. Performing Abortion Servs. v.

Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012).
6. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2015) (upholding Florida
law banning doctors from inquiring about patients' gun ownership).
7. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1236 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding California ban on
conversion therapy for children, applying rational basis review); King v. Governor of N.J., 767
F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014) (upholding New Jersey ban on conversion therapy as a regulation of
professional speech that passes intermediate scrutiny). See also H.B. 2307, 78th Leg. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015); D.C. CODE §§ 7:1231.01-15 (2015) (prohibiting mental health
professionals from engaging in sexual orientation change efforts with minors); and 405 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 48/30 (2016) (same).
8. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002) (enjoining the federal government
from revoking a physician's license on the basis of the physician's recommendation of medical
marijuana; applying strict scrutiny).
9. Final Exit Network, Inc. v. State, 722 S.E.2d 722 (Ga. 2012) (holding GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-5-5(b) (1994) to be an unconstitutional restriction of speech, applying strict scrutiny); State
v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 2014) (holding the State could prosecute an
individual for assisting another in committing suicide, but not for encouraging or advising
another to commit suicide; applying strict scrutiny).
10.

See Timothy Zick, ProfessionalRights Speech, 47 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1289, 1318 (2016)

(noting the frequency with which professionals engage in speech related to clients'
constitutional or legal rights).
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Amendment.11 In a case containing its most authoritative statement
on the issue, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.

Casey, the Court dismissed a free speech challenge to Pennsylvania's
abortion-specific informed consent statute in three brief sentences:
All that is left of petitioners' argument is an asserted First
Amendment right of a physician not to provide information
about the risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner
mandated by the State. To be sure, the physician's First
Amendment rights not to speak are implicated, see Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977),
but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to
reasonable licensing and regulation by the State, cf. Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603, 97 S.Ct. 869, 878, 51 L.Ed.2d 64
(1977). We see no constitutional infirmity in the requirement
that the physician
provide the information mandated by the
12
State here.

11. Id. at 1335.
12. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992). Numerous
commentators have criticized the Court's First Amendment analysis in Casey as incomplete.
See, e.g., Post, supra note 1, at 946 (referring to the Supreme Court's analysis of the First
Amendment issues in Casey as "puzzling"); Jennifer M. Keighley, Physician Speech and
Mandatory UltrasoundLaws: The FirstAmendment's Limit on Compelled Ideological Speech,
34 CARDozo L. REV. 2347, 2356 (2012) (describing the Supreme Court's discussion of the
First Amendment in Casey as "incredibly limited"); Sonia M. Suter, The FirstAmendment and
Physician Speech in Reproductive Decision Making, 43 J.L. MED & ETHICS 22, 24 (2015)
(criticizing the Casey opinion on the grounds that it "failed to characterize the nature of the
compelled speech, specify the strength of the First Amendment interest, or articulate the
standard of review that applied"); Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional
Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 771, 773 (1999)
(noting that the Casey passage "provides little guidance" on First Amendment issues); Scott W.
Gaylord, A Matter of Context: Casey and the Constitutionality of Compelled Physician Speech,
43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 35, 36 (2015) (describing courts' strggle to determine the proper
standard of review to use in light of Supreme Court precedent); B. Jessie Hill, Casey Meets the
Crisis Pregnancy Centers, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 59, 60 (2015) (noting that the Supreme Court
"has not addressed the First Amendment standards applicable to professional speech at length,"
and has discussed them "only obliquely"); Claudia E. Haupt, ProfessionalSpeech, 125 YALE
L.J. 1238, 1259 (2016) (describing the doctrinal basis of professional speech as "indeterminate
at best," and describing the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Casey as "cryptic"). See also
Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d. 238, 249 (4th Cir. 2014) ("The single paragraph in Casey does not
assert that physicians forfeit their First Amendment rights in the procedures surrounding
abortions, nor does it announce the proper level of scrutiny to be applied to abortion regulations
that compel speech to the extraordinary extent present here.").
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Lower courts since Casey have struggled to identify the appropriate
constitutional standards for reviewing state regulations of physician
speech, and the result is an uncertain body of law with a great deal of
room for creative argument.13
The purpose of this Article is to clarify the boundaries of
physicians' First Amendment rights when communicating with
patients. More specifically, this Article seeks to identify the most
doctrinally consistent reading of Supreme Court free speech
jurisprudence to understand what limits the First Amendment's
protection against compelled speech imposes in the context of state
informed consent mandates. 14 Its conclusion is that as a general
matter, physicians have First Amendment rights that are independent
of (and therefore supplement) their patients' constitutional rights, but
that these rights are limited. The First Amendment permits states to
impose physician speech mandates that are reasonably related to the
regulation of medical practice-a regulatory sphere that has been
interpreted quite broadly. The mandate must, however, compel
disclosure of only "factual and uncontroversial" information; that
said, there is a great deal of ambiguity about what this limitation
means. Informed consent mandates that require physicians to
communicate "ideological" speech are likely subject to strict
scrutiny; though, again, the definition of what counts as "ideological"
speech is widely disputed. And while an otherwise unconstitutional
speech mandate will not be cured simply because a physician can
disassociate himself from the objectionable speech, there is some
uncertainty as to whether a physician's inability to disassociate
himself from otherwise factual, uncontroversial, and ideological
informed consent mandates might render those mandates
unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's compelled speech
jurisprudence.

13. Zick, supra note 10, at 1298.
14. This Article focuses exclusively on compulsions of physician speech, rather than
prohibitions, which might be evaluated under different constitutional standards. Suter, supra
note 12, at 28; Post, supra note 1, at 980-81; Martha Swartz, Physician-Patient Communication
and the First Amendment After Sorrell, 17 MICH. ST. J. MED. & L. 101, 113-14 (2012). But see
Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988) ("There is certainly
some difference between compelled speech and compelled silence, but in the context of
protected speech, the difference is without constitutional significance .... ).
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While the primary context in which this question has arisen is that
of abortion-specific informed consent mandates, this inquiry has
broader implications for informed consent law as a whole. 15 If the
First Amendment imposes substantial limits on the type of physician
speech that states can compel, then every state informed consent
law-from the most benign to the most controversial-is potentially
at risk. It is the Author's hope that this Article's point-by-point
explanation of the facts, fictions, and open questions relating to this
issue will provide readers with an accessible guide to First
Amendment doctrine in the context of compelled physician speech.
FICTION: PHYSICIAN SPEECH RECEIVES NO PROTECTION UNDER
THE FIRST AMENDMENT.
FACT: PHYSICIAN SPEECH DOES RECEIVE SOME PROTECTION
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT.

Healthcare providers in the United States have been heavily regulated
since the 1800s. Most notably, physicians whose practice departs
from the standard of care are subject to malpractice liability.
Malpractice suits arise not only when injury results from a
physician's actions, but also when injury results from a physician's
words-for example, when the physician gives a patient incorrect
medical advice, fails to tell a patient about a treatment option, or fails
to inform a patient of risks associated with treatment. As Robert Post
notes, "Without so much as a nod to the First Amendment, doctors
are routinely held liable for malpractice for speaking or for failing to
speak. 16 In this light, it may first appear that physicians' rights to
protection from state speech regulations are nonexistent. 17
15. Other less-controversial contexts in which informed consent disclosure mandates have
come under dispute include breast cancer counseling (Susan G. Nayfield et al., Statutory
Requirements for Disclosure of Breast Cancer Treatment Alternatives, 86 J. NAT'L CANCER
INSTIT. 1202 (1994); Nancy M. Capello, Decade of 'Normal' Mammography Reports The
Happygram, 10 J. AMER. COLL. RADIOL. 903 (2013); Outdated Breast Cancer Informed

Consent Law Repealed, PENN. MED. Soc'Y, http://www.pamedsoc.org/MainMenuCategories/
Laws-Politics/News- from-Harrisburg/Legislation-News/Breast-cancer-informed-consent.html (last
updated Feb. 20, 2014)); end-of-life care (Patient Self-Determination Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395cc(f)(1) (2000); and dental amalgams (see Post, supra note 1).
16.

Post, supra note 1, at 950.

17. Id. at 951 (noting that First Amendment values "seem to carry very little force" in the
context of informed consent); Keighley, supra note 12, at 2348-49 (noting that circuit courts'
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But while the practice of medicine is highly regulated, and while
reasonable medical regulations are rarely challenged by health care
providers, this does not lead to the conclusion that physicians lack
First Amendment rights altogether.18
First, some government speech mandates would raise obvious
First Amendment concerns.1 9 If, for example, a state required that
physicians tell their patients that the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA) infringes on their personal liberties, or
that legislators who vote in favor of PPACA ought not be re-elected,
surely the state would bear a significant burden in defending such a
law against a First Amendment challenge.20
Moreover, First Amendment jurisprudence in the context of pure
commercial speech, a category of speech that receives lesser
constitutional protection than private speech, provides that even state
mandates of messages that are not as politically or ideologically
charged are subject to constitutional review under the Zauderer and
Central Hudson standards. 21 For example, we would likely view
"with constitutional alarm" any laws that prohibited physicians from
communicating truthful information to patients, or compelled
22
physicians to convey inaccurate or misleading information. While
courts and commentators have struggled to identify the precise
boundaries of the distinction between commercial and professional

decisions in abortion informed consent cases suggest that "physicians retain virtually no First
Amendment rights while they are practicing medicine."); Zick, supra note 10, at 1292 (noting
that malpractice and professional licensing laws "are typically merely considered incidental
regulations of speech, and as such are not generally subject to First Amendment challenge or
scrutiny"); id. at 1297 (citing Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985)).
18. See generally Post, supra note 1; Keighley, supra note 12; Halberstam, supra note 12;
Zick, supra note 10.
19. Zick, supra note 10 at 1321-22 (citing examples).
20. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 12, at 65-66 (noting that ideologically charged compelled
physician speech would be subject to a high standard of scrutiny). But see Post, supra note 1, at
952 (arguing that the reason for striking down a law compelling physicians to speak on political
matters is because such a law would not count as regulation of professional speech; rather, it
would "compel speech that is not understood as included within the practice of medicine," and
therefore be subject to Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)). See also infra text at notes
32-33.
21. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626
(1985); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
22. Post, supra note 1, at 977-78.
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speech,23 many agree that professional speech ought to receive at
least as much protection (if not more) than commercial speech. 24 As
Daniel Halberstam writes, "[a]t a minimum, professional speech
should be accorded no less protection than commercial speech ....
Indeed, as compared to commercial speech, we might even expect the
deeper relationship between physician and patient to lead, at least in
some cases,
to protection beyond that afforded to commercial
25
speech.
Despite the intuitive appeal of the claim that professional speech
should be entitled to at least the same level of protection as
commercial speech, as a practical matter, the First Amendment
protections physicians receive in the context of medical practice are
likely to be somewhat limited. As Robert Post notes, "in the context
of medical practice we insist upon competence, not debate, and so we
subject professional speech to an entirely different regulatory
regime. ,26 It would indeed be problematic to envision a degree of
First Amendment protection that "would render ordinary informed
consent doctrine constitutionally questionable, so that every
malpractice case involving informed consent would suddenly entail
large constitutional questions."2 The rest of this Article outlines the
contours of these First Amendment protections, limited as they might
be.
FICTION:

PHYSICIANS'

FIRST AMENDMENT

RIGHTS

ARE

MERELY DERIVATIVE OF THEIR PATIENTS' RIGHTS.
FACT:

PHYSICIANS

HAVE

FIRST

AMENDMENT

RIGHTS

INDEPENDENT OF THEIR PATIENTS.

The claim that physicians' First Amendment rights are merely
derivative of their patients' rights-rather than arising from the
physicians'
own
constitutional
interests-is
a
common
23. See generally id. at 974-78; Suter, supra note 12, at 23; Swartz, supra note 14, at 122.
24. See, e.g., Post supra note 1, at 977-78; Keighley, supra note 12, at 2367.
25. Halberstam, supra note 12, at 838.
26. Post, supra note 1, at 950.
27. Id. at 973. See also id. at 981 ("The history and importance of mandated medical
disclosures is so entrenched that it cannot be called into constitutional question.").
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misconception, one grounded in the Supreme Court's language in
Whalen v. Roe.28
Whalen v. Roe, one of the two cases cited in Casey as relevant to
the issue of physicians' First Amendment rights, considered the
constitutional implications of New York statutes requiring physicians
to report patients' prescription drug information to the state. The
petitioners in Whalen were patients bringing Fourteenth Amendment
privacy claims, as well as physicians independently alleging that the
laws violate the Fourteenth Amendment by "unnecessarily invad[ing]
...the doctor's right to prescribe treatment for his patients solely on
the basis of medical considerations. 2 9 In rejecting the physicians'
claim, the Court held that it0 was "derivative from, and therefore no
stronger than, the patients.,,3
Notably, the physicians' claim in Whalen was not a First
Amendment claim about the right to speak, but rather a Fourteenth
Amendment claim about the right to prescribe without undue
interference by the state. And the Supreme Court's decision in Casey,
while containing a brief citation to Whalen, by no means established
that physicians' First Amendment rights are merely derivative of
their patients' rights.
For example, consider a law like the one described earlier,
requiring physicians to make statements opposing PPACA when
meeting with patients. Any First Amendment objection the physician
might have to such a law, and any constitutional challenge thereby
brought, would surely be separate from her patients' right to privacy
in medical decision-making. 31 A patient making medical decisions is
28. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). See Gaylord, supra note 12, at 44 ("As Whalen instructs, the
physicians' rights are derivative of her patients' ... [b]ecause the physician's rights are derived
from those of his or her patient, the doctor cannot receive greater protection under the First
Amendment than the patient gets under the due process clause."); Halberstam, supra note 12, at
835 ("The First Amendment aspect of [the contraception and abortion] decisions has frequently
gone unappreciated, in part ...due to the Court's own statements implying that a physician's
constitutional rights are to be subsumed under the rights of the patient to receive treatment.").
29. Appellees' Brief at *5,Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (No. 75-839), 1976 WL
181401 (U.S); Whalen, 429 U.S. at 604 (referring to physicians' argument that the laws "impair

their right to practice medicine free of unwarranted state interference").
30.
31.

Whalen, 429 U.S. at 604.
Note, however, that the precise contours of a patient's constitutional rights to privacy

in medical decision-making are far from clear. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health,
497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (assuming, without deciding, that a patient's constitutional liberty
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not constrained in her choices if her physician makes political
statements during their encounter; she may be offended, but unless
the physician makes these statements against the patient's objections,
the patient's right of autonomous decision-making is not infringed in
any way. This scenario demonstrates that physicians' rights to speak
freely can be infringed upon by state regulation without an associated
infringement on the patients' constitutional rights.
The scenario above might, however, be challenged on the grounds
that it does not in fact represent a case of compelled professional
speech. Just because a person holds a license to practice medicine
does not mean that every word she says will be considered
"professional speech," even if she utters those words while providing
medical care to a patient.12 Similarly, not every state speech mandate
affecting physicians should be treated as a regulation of professional
speech; mandates of ideological or political statements, for example,
may be better interpreted as compulsions of private speech subject to
the dictates of Wooley and Barnette.33 Thus, one might argue that
while physicians have First Amendment rights as private speakers,
independent of their patients, their rights to speak as professionals are
necessarily derivative.
A compelling defense to this challenge is offered by Claudia
Haupt, who theorizes a model of professional speech rights grounded
in shared knowledge communities.34 She argues that separate and
apart from the patient's interest in decisional autonomy, physicians
have an independent autonomy interest in ensuring that their speech
is consistent with professional norms.3 5 "The professional not only
speaks for herself, but also as a member of a learned profession-that
is, the knowledge community. ' , 3 6 Therefore, the speaker has an
"autonomy interest in communicating her message according to the

interest under the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses the refusal of lifesaving medical
treatment).
32. Post, supra note 1, at 952-53; Halberstam, supra note 12, at 843. Post offers, as
examples, a spontaneous utterance made by a physician who twists his ankle, or a prayer said
by a surgeon before an operation. Post, supra note 1, at 952 (concluding that only speech that

"forms ...the practice of medicine" counts as professional speech).
33. Post, supra note 1, at 952; Haupt, supra note 12, at 1299-1300.
34. See generally Haupt, supra note 12.
35. Id. at 1272-73.
36. Id.
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standardsof the profession to which she belongs .... Physicians, for
instance, thus cannot be compelled to speak in a way that undermines
their profession's scientific insights."3
Post offers another nuanced explanation of the imperfect overlap
between physicians' First Amendment rights and patients'
constitutional rights: he recognizes that physicians have independent
First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, but acknowledges that
the reasons they hold those rights may be more closely tied to the
patient's right to accurate medical information than to traditional
justifications offered in defense of the right to freedom of speech,
such as the speaker's autonomy interests, the importance of
maintaining a free marketplace of ideas, or the value of public
discourse to democratic self-governance.38 However, the fact that the
values underpinning the importance of free speech vary depending on
the speaker does not imply that a professional speaker lacks
independent First Amendment rights. Under Post's view, therefore,
while physicians may raise free speech challenges to state laws
compelling informed consent speech, the patients' interests in
obtaining accurate information surely has some relevance to the
constitutional analysis.3 9

37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. Post, supra note 1, at 977-80, 984-85. See also Keighley, supra note 12, at 2370-77
(discussing, among other issues, the limited applicability of the "marketplace of ideas"
argument to context of physician -patient communication); Zick, supra note 10, at 1344-45
("Commentators have argued that professional speech regulations generally implicate the free
speech rights of both clients and professionals, and that coverage and protection for
professional speech is justified under some or all of the principal First amendment theoriesautonomy, self-government, and the search for truth.").
39. Post, supra note 1, at 985 (arguing that while medical providers have a fight to sue
when they are forced to communicate misleading information, "the content of this right must be
determined by the public's interest in the receipt of unbiased, expert, medical information.").
See also Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867 (2015)
[hereinafter Post, Compelled Commercial Speech] (discussing the informational function of
commercial communication); Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace: Employer

Speech and the First Amendment, MINN. L. REV. at 8 (forthcoming 2016), draft available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract id=2738808&download=yes [hereinafter Norton,
Truth and Lies in the Workplace] (arguing that while individual professional speakers like
physicians and attorneys "have substantial expressive interests of their own, governments-and
courts-often choose to privilege their listeners' autonomy, enlightenment and self-government
interests in receiving accurate information"); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United
States, 559 U.S. 229, 249 (2010) (citing Zauderer for the proposition that "First Amendment
protection for commercial speech is justified in large part by the information's value to
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Whichever interpretation the reader may find more compelling, it
is clear that while the patient's right to accurate information that
fosters autonomous medical decision-making is one interest at stake
in cases of compelled physician speech, it is far from the only
relevant interest. The boundaries of a physician's right to speak freely
may be impacted by the patient's informational needs, but this does
not lead to the conclusion that the physician's First Amendment
rights are purely derivative.
FACT: LAWS COMPELLING PHYSICIAN SPEECH SATISFY FIRST
AMENDMENT SCRUTINY IF THEY ARE REASONABLY RELATED
TO THE REGULATION OF MEDICAL PRACTICE.
OPEN QUESTION: HOW FAR DO THE STATE'S INTERESTS IN
REGULATING THE MEDICAL PROFESSION EXTEND?

In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the

Supreme Court rejected the physicians' First Amendment challenge
to Pennsylvania's informed consent requirements on the grounds that
"the physician's First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated,
but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable
licensing and regulation by the State.",40 This is consistent with the
Court's jurisprudence regarding government regulation of
professional speech in the practice of the law, which holds that such
regulation is permissible only if it aligns with the state's interest in
consumers."). But see Robert Post, A Doctor Has Limited First Amendment Rights, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 21, 2014, 2:03 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/08/20/when-dodoctors-have-the-right-to-speak/a-doctor-has-limited-first-amendment-rights ("A doctor may
sue to raise this constitutional issue, but it is misleading to imagine that the doctor is asserting
her personal First Amendment rights to speak as she wishes. It is more accurate to imagine that
she is a constitutional spokeswoman for the rights of her patients to be informed. This is
analogous to the kind of First Amendment rights we apply in the domain of what is known as
'commercial speech."').
40. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (internal citations
omitted). This phrasing has been interpreted by some scholars to mean that physicians' First
Amendment objections to compelled speech are subject to merely rational basis review. See,
e.g., Gaylord, supra note 12, at 36. But see Halberstam, supra note 12, at 837 (cautioning that
the Casey passage should not be interpreted as requiring "the kind of rationality review used for
economic regulations under the Due Process clause," but rather "a more stringent rationality
review with some consideration of the First Amendment values 'implicated' in the
communications between professional and client").
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professional regulation as a whole.41 In Keller v. State Bar of
California, a case rejecting the California Bar's use of compulsory
attorney dues to finance ideological activities, the Court held that bar
dues could only be constitutionally used to fund activities germane to
the state's interest in "regulating the legal profession and improving
the quality of legal services. 42 Likewise, in Legal Services Corp. v.
Velazquez, the Court rejected restrictions on federally funded
attorney speech on the grounds that they "distort[ed] the legal system
by altering the traditional role of the attorneys," thus tying the
permissibility of speech restrictions to the state's interest in
professional regulation.4 3 In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, another
attorney speech case, the Court wrote that "[w]hen a state regulation
implicates First Amendment rights, the Court must balance those
interests against the State's legitimate interest in regulating the
activity in question. 44 A similar theme was raised in Zauderer, when
the Court tied the permissibility of compelling attorneys to disclose
information in advertisements to the state's interest in preventing
consumer deception about the terms under which attorney services
are available.45
It is insufficient, however, to end this inquiry by concluding that
the state's power to regulate physician speech is grounded in its
rights to regulate the medical profession as a whole. Unless we
understand the precise nature of the state's interest in medical
regulation and examine how far the state's powers to regulate
medicine might extend, this conclusion is incomplete.
States are authorized to regulate medicine and other professions
by virtue of their police power, the unenumerated power to protect

41. Hill, supra note 12, at 61-62 (noting that the Supreme Court has "drawn the line at
government regulations that distort the speech of professionals in ways that do not appear to

serve any traditional government interest in regulating the profession").
42.

Keller v.State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1990).

43. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 544 (2001).
44.

Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991). See also Lowe v. SEC, 472

U.S. 181, 228-29 (White, J. concurring) (noting that professional licensing and qualification
standards do not violate the First Amendment even when the profession's work is
communicative in nature).
45. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
651 (1985).
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the health, safety, and welfare of a state's citizenry.46 As explained by
the Supreme Court in Dent v. West Virginia, it is "[t]he power of the
State to provide for the general welfare of its people [that] authorizes
it to prescribe all such regulations as in its judgment will secure or
tend to secure them against the consequences of ignorance and
incapacity, as well as of deception and fraud." 47 The goal of medical
regulation as a whole is widely understood to be protecting patients
by ensuring that physicians satisfy the standards considered
appropriate-by legislators, licensing boards, and medical
practitioners-to the medical profession. 48 Thus, "professional
standards of care can provide at least partial guidance concerning the
proper scope of professional speech regulations. 4 9
However, legislators and medical boards tend to interpret the
boundaries of permissible medical regulation quite broadly. For
example, in the realm of physician licensure and discipline,
physicians are frequently disciplined for "unethical conduct," even
when that conduct takes place outside their professional lives.50

46. See Nadia N. Sawicki, Character, Competence, and the Principles of Medical
Discipline, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 285,289-90 (2010).
47. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889).
48. See, e.g., Sawicki, supra note 46, at 289-90, 294-97 (discussing goals of medical
licensure and discipline); Lauren R. Robbins, Comment, Open Your Mouth and Say 'Ideology':
Physicians and the First Amendment, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 165 (2009) (arguing that
government regulation of medicine is intended to "ensure that physicians are practicing
medicine within the profession's standards"). See also Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S.
232, 239 (1957) (holding that the criteria for professional licensure and discipline "must have a
rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice" his profession); Dent,
129 U.S. at 122 ("The nature and extent of the qualifications required must depend primarily
upon the judgment of the State as to their necessity. If they are appropriate to the calling or
profession, and attainable by reasonable study or application, no objection to their validity can
be raised because of their stringency or difficulty. It is only when they have no relation to such
calling or profession, or are unattainable by such reasonable study and application, that they can
operate to deprive one of his right to pursue a lawful vocation.").
49. Zick, supra note 10, at 1299 (analyzing the Court's holding in Milavetz Gallop &
Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010)).
50. The most common grounds for professional discipline of physicians fall into three
categories: drug and alcohol abuse, criminal convictions, and unspecified "unprofessional
conduct." Sawicki, supra note 46, 303-04. Very few of these cases involve misconduct directly
linked to medical practice-for example, in the context of substance abuse, most physicians are
disciplined not for practicing medicine under the influence or abusing prescribing privileges,
but rather for substance abuse problems not manifesting themselves in the professional sphere
(such as driving under the influence). Id. at 304. Discipline on the basis of criminal conviction,
likewise, is often based on conduct with no apparent impact on patient safety or public health,
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Courts frequently uphold disciplinary actions against physicians who
engage in character-related misconduct, even when that misconduct
51
does not directly impact patients' medical care .
This suggests that the requirement that physician speech mandates
be reasonably related to the regulation of medical practice will not
serve as much of a limiting factor in evaluating the constitutionality
of these mandates. Between the spectrum of obviously impermissible
speech mandates (such as compelled political or ideological speech)
and mandates of purely medical information lie a host of other
possible disclosure mandates that physicians will claim fall outside
the state's authority, but that could reasonably be interpreted to relate
to the regulation of medical practice.
FICTION:
FIRST

LAWS

COMPELLING

AMENDMENT

DISCLOSURE

SCRUTINY

OF INFORMATION

PHYSICIAN

SPEECH

SATISFY

ONLY

THEY

REQUIRE

THAT

IF
IS

TRUTHFUL,

NOT

MISLEADING, AND RELEVANT TO PATIENTS.
FACT: LAWS COMPELLING PHYSICIAN SPEECH SATISFY FIRST
AMENDMENT SCRUTINY ONLY IF THEY REQUIRE DISCLOSURE
OF PURELY FACTUAL AND UNCONTROVERSIAL INFORMATION.

OPEN QUESTION: WHAT QUALIFIES AS "PURELY FACTUAL
AND UNCONTROVERSIAL" INFORMATION?

In Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the
Supreme Court held that informed consent mandates for abortions
passed constitutional muster so long as the state was only compelling
physicians to provide "truthful and not misleading" information
"relevant" to a woman's decision.5 2 This standard has since been used
by lower courts in evaluating abortion-related informed consent
requirements, and correctly so. But it is essential to recognize that the
"truthful, not misleading, and relevant" requirement is a condition on
the constitutionality of disclosure laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment's "undue burden" standard, rather than a condition of the

such as personal income tax fraud, shoplifting, public drunkenness, and violence against
friends, family, or strangers outside the treatment context. Id. at 304-05.

51.

Id.

52.

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882-83 (1992).
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First Amendment. 53 Therefore, in cases where the physician's First
Amendment rights are not expressed in a context of a woman's
Fourteenth Amendment right (as where states impose informed
consent mandates in non-reproductive contexts), the "truthful, not
misleading, and relevant" requirement would not apply.
To understand the requirements for evaluating physician speech
mandates outside the abortion context, we must turn instead to

Zauderer, a compelled-speech case dealing with attorney
advertising.54 In Zauderer, the Court upheld a state law requiring
attorneys to include "purely factual and uncontroversial information"
about the terms of their services in advertising.55 Although attorneys
are professionals, the Court described this case as one dealing with
commercial speech, likely because the case dealt exclusively with
attorneys' commercial advertisements rather than their speech in
communications with clients.5 6 For the reasons noted above,
however, the Court would likely treat professional speech as being
entitled to at least the same level of protection as commercial speech,
if not more. Therefore, courts facing First Amendment challenges to
53. Id. at 883 (holding that the informed consent requirements about fetal characteristics
and post-pregnancy assistance "cannot be considered a substantial obstacle to obtaining an
abortion, and, it follows, there is no undue burdef' in its analysis of the patients' Fourteenth
Amendment claims). See generally Post, supra note 1, at 945-46 (noting that only after
introducing the "truthful and not misleading" standard in the context of the patients' due
process claim did the court turn to the First Amendment arguments); Keighley, supra note 12,
at 2354 et seq (noting that the Casey opinion's "brief treatment of the First Amendment issues"
arose only after its discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment undue burden standard and
provided "minimal information about how the Court views the interplay between the state's
ability to regulate the medical profession and physicians' First Amendment rights"); Suter,
supra note 12, at 23-24 (noting the distinction between the "bulk of the plurality opinion,"
which addressed the substantive due process issue and the application of the undue burden
standard to the informed consent law, and the "mere two sentences" of discussion of the First
Amendment issues).
54. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626
(1985).

55. Id. Some commentators have interpreted Zauderer's requirement that the disclosure be
factual as being linked to the requirement that a disclosure be a reasonable regulation of
commercial activity. See Post, supra note 1, at 971 (arguing, with respect to abortion informed
consent laws, "[i]f the disclosures required . ..are false, [the state] can have no legitimate
interest in mandating them, and they are unconstitutional because irrational").
56. Note that one lower court has questioned whether the Zauderertest is even applicable
outside the advertising context. Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 522 (D.C. Cir.
2015) ("[T]he Supreme Court's opinion in Zauderer is confined to advertising, emphatically
and, one may infer, intentionally.").
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physician speech mandates should, at the very least, evaluate the
5
compelled speech to see if it is "purely factual and uncontroversial."
58
Casey.
in
took
Circuit
Third
the
This, in fact, is the approach that
Robert Post notes that Zauderer's limitation that disclosure
mandates be "factual and uncontroversial" may not be an appropriate
test in the professional speech context, given that professionals by
their very nature are required to give their clients opinions (legal
opinions, medical opinions, etc.) in addition to providing them with
facts. 5 9 Thus, professional regulations and malpractice standards
necessarily implicate the ways in which professionals convey
opinions to their clients. However, I would suggest that the existence
of liability standards for medical malpractice in contexts where
physicians' communications are implicated does not negate the
applicability of the Zauderer standard to professional contexts.
Malpractice law imposes liability for physician speech that falls
outside the standard of care, either because a physician is providing
incorrect information or dangerous opinions (in which case the threat
of liability operates as a restriction on speech), or because the
physician fails to provide information as part of informed consent (in

57. There remains some uncertainty, however, as to whether the Zauderer test applies
only in contexts where the state's interest is preventing consumer deception, or where other
state interests might justify use of the Zauderer standard. The Supreme Court has not clarified
this issue. Compare Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (agreeing with
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1213 (2012) that the Zauderer test is
"limited to cases in which disclosure requirements are 'reasonably related to the State's interest
in preventing deception of consumers"') with Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (overruling Nat'l Ass ni of Mfrs, holding that the use of Zaudereris not limited to cases
where the state's interest is preventing consumer deception). See also Jennifer M. Keighley,
Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the FirstAmendment, 15 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 539, 542 (2012) (concluding that the "curing consumer deception" standard is
only one of many permissible government goals). For the purposes of this Article, it is assumed
that Zauderer applies more broadly. See Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 22 ("The language with
which Zaudererjustified its approach, however, sweeps far more broadly than the interest in
remedying deception.").
58. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 705-06 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd in
part, rev 'd in part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reviewing Pennsylvania's abortion informed consent
requirements under the Zauderer standard). One might question whether there is a practical
difference between Casey's "truthful, not misleading and relevant" standard and Zauderer's
"factual and uncontroversial" standard. While the two are indeed similar, my interpretation is
that the Zauderer standard may more limited in what it allows, given how broadly the definition
of "controversial" might be construed.
59. Email from Robert Post, Dean and Sol & Lillian Goldman Professor of Law, Yale
Law School, to author (Sept. 2, 2015, 09:58 EST) (on file with author).
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which case the threat of liability effectively operates as a speech
mandate requiring disclosure of certain types of factual information).
But in no way does the modern common law of malpractice or
informed consent require that physicians share specific opinions
mandated by the state on a particular topic. And to the extent that
statutory disclosure mandates might require disclosure to all patients
of opinions not verifiable by factual inquiry-for example, "The best
treatment in your case would be mastectomy combined with
be constitutionally
chemotherapy"-those
would certainly
problematic. Therefore, it is likely that an inquiry into the
constitutionality of a professional speech mandate would be subject
to Zauderer's "factual and uncontroversial" requirement.
This, of course, leaves us with the open question of what counts as
"purely factual and uncontroversial information," and who bears the
burden of proving whether this requirement is or is not satisfied.60
The Supreme Court has provided little guidance for determining
whether a given disclosure is "factual and uncontroversial" under the
Zauderer standard, as opposed to non-factual or controversial, and
therefore subject to a different standard of review. In Zauderer, the
Court did not define "factual and uncontroversial," but merely
concluded that disclosures of clients' cost obligations under
contingent fee arrangements "easily pass[] muster" under this
standard. 6611 In Milavetz, a more recent case applying Zauderer to a
federal requirement that bankruptcy law firms describe themselves as
"debt relief agencies" in advertisements, the Court evaluated whether
the mandated disclosure was reasonably related to the state's interests
60. For further discussion of the evidentiary and burden-shifting issues, see Post, supra
note 1, at 972 (arguing that proving falsity under a deferential standard of review "is
exceedingly difficult, if not impossible," and suggesting that the First Amendment shifts the
burden of defending mandated disclosures to the state) and id. at 988 (discussing "exactly how
divided expert opinion must be before the Constitution will permit the political system to
override otherwise dominant or officially endorsed professional beliefs").
61. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652. Cf Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs., 800 F.3d at 527 (questioning
whether the Supreme Court in Zauderer intended "factual and uncontroversial" to state a legal
standard, or whether the reference was merely a descriptive statement about the disclosure
requirement in that case).
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without even analyzing if the required disclosure was factual and
uncontroversial.6 2
In the absence of further guidance from the Court about what
types of contested disclosures qualify as factual and uncontroversial,
lower courts have been challenged to make such determinations on
their own. 63 A number of appellate courts have addressed this issue in
both commercial and professional speech cases. While there is clear
agreement that a mandated disclosure fails Zauderer's "factual and

uncontroversial" requirement if it requires a speaker to communicate
subjective opinions rather than facts, other issues are less clear.64
A. Matters of Public Debate
The first question frequently addressed by courts in these contexts
is whether accurate factual disclosures mandated about subjects that
are matters of public controversy or debate might be deemed
"controversial" and therefore outside the scope of Zauderer. In the
anomalous case of Evergreen Ass 'n, Inc. v. City of New York, the
Second Circuit addressed a New York law requiring crisis pregnancy

62. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 248-53 (2010).
However, the Court in Milavetz seemed to acknowledge that, if the term "debt relief agencies"
were found to be misleading, the state could not reasonably argue that mandating the use of this
phrase was necessary to serve its interest in preventing consumer deception. Id. at 250-53.
63. Note, though, that most courts considering mandated disclosure laws have dealt with
fairly straightforward disclosures of purely factual information. See, e.g., N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n
v. NYC Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that a law requiring restaurants to
post calorie information on their menus required disclosure of factual information and was
therefore subject to Zauderer review); Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104 (2d Cir.
2001) (treating labeling requirements about the content of and disposal methods for lamps
containing mercury as requiring disclosure of factual commercial information); United States v.
Wenger, 427 F.3d 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (treating disclosure of status as a paid stock promoter
and financial compensation as meeting Zauderer's factual and uncontroversial requirement).
64. See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014), adheredto on
reh 'g sub nom., Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015), overruled by Am.
Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that the phrase "conflict free" is a
"metaphor that conveys moral responsibility," and one with which an issuer might strongly
disagree); Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 966-67 (9th Cir.
2009) (holding that requiring an "18" label on violent video games "does not convey factual
information" unless the game can be legally classified as "violent"), aff'd sub nom., Brown v.
Entm't Merchants Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 180 L. Ed. 2d 708 (2011) (note, however, that the
Supreme Court did not address this issue on appeal); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich,
469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that an "18" sticker "ultimately communicates a
subjective and highly controversial message-that the game's content is sexually explicit").
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centers to disclose, among other things, whether they provide
referrals for abortion, emergency contraception, or prenatal care
(Services Disclosure) and whether they have a licensed medical
provider on staff (Status Disclosure)>5 Although these disclosures
appear on their face to be purely factual in nature-that is, they can
be verified or rejected objectively by reference to undisputed factsthe court rejected the Services disclosure as unconstitutional on the
grounds that it "mandates discussion of controversial political
topics, 66 and "requires centers to mention controversial services that
some pregnancy services centers ... oppose."67

However, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
American Meat Institute v. USDA took a different view when

considering a USDA rule requiring country-of-origin labels on meat
products. 6' Neither party disputed that the information required on
the label was factual, and the court squarely rejected the idea that the
labels might be deemed controversial because they require
communication of "a message that is controversial for some reason
other than a dispute about simple factual accuracy., 69 A dissenting
opinion

in National Ass'n of Manufacturers v. SEC agreed,

interpreting the court's decision in American Meat Institute to mean
that a required disclosure of undisputed facts that somehow "touches
on a 'controversial' topic ...cannot render the disclosure
'controversial' in the sense meant by Zauderer.",70 Numerous other
courts and commentators have likewise concluded that the question
65. Evergreen Ass'n, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 740 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub
non. Evergreen Ass'n, Inc. v. City of N.Y., N.Y., 135 S. Ct. 435 (2014), and Pregnancy Care
Ctr. of N.Y. v. City of N.Y., N.Y., 135 S. Ct. 435 (2014).
66. Id. at 250. The court distinguished the Services Disclosure from the Status Disclosure,
which it upheld, describing it as a "brief, bland, and non-pejorative disclosure." Id.
67. Id. at 245 n.6.
68. Am. Meat Inst.
v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (2014). The USDA rule required disclosing the
location of each step of the meat production process: "For example, meat derived from an
animal born in Canada and raised and slaughtered in the United States, which formerly could
have been labeled 'Product of the United States and Canada,' would now have to be labeled
'Born in Canada, Raised and Slaughtered in the United States."' Id. at 21.
69. Id. at 27.
70. Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 538 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Srinivasan, J.,
dissenting). However, the majority opinion in this case, when discussing the challenges in
understanding "uncontroversial" disclosures to be those based on opinion rather than facts,
seemingly interpreted the factual country-of-origin labels in American Meat Institute as being
"controversial" for reasons other than factual accuracy. Id. at 528.
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of whether a required disclosure is "controversial" speaks only to its
factual accuracy, rather than its mere relevance to a topic of public
debate. Indeed, this interpretation seems most consistent with the

Supreme Court's statements in the context of state restrictions on
speech, where the Court has held that public controversy surrounding
accurate factual statements do not render that speech non-commercial
and therefore subject to a higher standard of scrutiny. 2
B. Confusing Language and Statutory Definitions
A second question courts have asked about Zauderer's "factual
and uncontroversial" requirement is whether a mandated disclosure
might violate that test if it uses language that is misleading,
confusing, or might lead to consumer misunderstanding because it
relies on a statutory definition that differs from the plain meaning of
the language used. 3 In National Ass 'n of Manufacturers v. SEC, for
example, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
considered an SEC rule requiring firms to describe their products as
"not DRC conflict free" if they are made from minerals originating in

71. See Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 39, at 910 (arguing that
"mandated factual disclosures" should not be treated as constitutionally suspect simply
"because they occur in circumstances of circumstances of acrimonious political controversy,"
and that Zauderer's "uncontroversial" requirement would "seem best interpreted as a
description of the epistemological status of the" required disclosure); Norton, Truth and Lies in
the Workplace, supra note 39, at 40-41 ("An approach more consistent with the protection of
listeners' First Amendment interests would thus understand 'factual and uncontroversial' in this
context to refer to assertions that are provable (or disprovable) as a factual matter in the same
way required of contested assertions in defamation, perjury, and antifraud law."); Gaylord,
supra note 12, at 49 n.91 ("In the context of professional speech, 'uncontroversial' cannot
prohibit disclosures related to controversial topics-otherwise Casey would have been decided
differently."); Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-cv-117, 2015 WL 1931142, at *25-26
(D. Vt. Apr. 27, 2015) (holding that compelled disclosures may be interpreted as
"controversial" only when they are opinion-based, and not when they purely factual, despite the
fact that the disclosure laws were enacted in the context of "partisan debate").
72. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Sew-. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563
n.5 (1980) (refusing to "grant broad constitutional protection to any advertising that links a
product to a current public debate"); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68
(1983) (citing Central Hudson for the proposition that "advertising which 'links a product to a
current public debate' is not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded
noncommercial speech").
73. See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277,
1330 (2014) (referring to the invocation of a statutory definition "to transform a plainly
ideological statement into a neutral fact" as "sleight of hand").
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the Congo or other countries, where such minerals finance or benefit
armed groups in those countries. 4 The court concluded that "it is far
from clear that the description at issue-whether
a product is
75
'conflict free'-is factual and non-ideological.",
The label "[not] conflict free" is a metaphor that conveys
moral responsibility for the Congo war. It requires an issuer to
tell consumers that its products are ethically tainted, even if
they only indirectly finance armed groups. An issuer, including
an issuer who condemns the atrocities of the Congo war in the
strongest terms, may disagree with that assessment of its moral
responsibility. 76
On rehearing, the court again concluded that "the statutory definition
of 'conflict free' cannot save this law." In other words, although the
phrase "DRC conflict free" was defined in a factual and objectively
verifiable way, the phrase could be understood to communicate a
judgment about moral responsibility, and therefore fall outside of
Zauderer's scope. Robert Post interprets the court's interpretation as
grounded not in the question of whether the mandated disclosure
communicates facts, but whether a "reasonable audience" would
"understand the phrase to mean a confession of ethical taint and
74. Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2014), adhered to on reh 'g
sub nom., Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015), overruled on other
grounds by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
75. Id. at 371. See also Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
("In our initial opinion we stated that the description at issue-whether a product is 'conflict
free' or 'not conflict free'-was hardly 'factual and non-ideological.' . . . We see no reason to
change our analysis in this respect.").
76. Nat'lAssn'of Mfrs., 800 F.3d at 530.
77. Id. at 529-30. But see id. at 532 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the meaning

of the phrase "conflict free" seems "quite apparent in context," and that a consumer could "with
little effort, learn that it carries a specific meaning prescribed by law").
78. Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,364 (Sept. 12, 2012) ("The term DRC
conflict free means that a product does not contain conflict minerals necessary to the
functionality or production of that product that directly or indirectly finance or benefit armed
groups, as defined in paragraph (d)(2) of this item, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or
an adjoining country. Conflict minerals that a registrant obtains from recycled or scrap sources,

as defined in paragraph (d)(6) of this item, are considered DRC conflict free."); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(p)(1)(D) (2012) ("[A] product may be labeled as 'DRC conflict free' if the product does
not contain conflict minerals that directly or indirectly finance or benefit armed groups in the

Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country.").
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Notably, even the dissenting opinion in National Ass 'n

of Manufacturers v. SEC, while disagreeing with the majority's

conclusion that the phrase "conflict free" might be misleading, agreed
that some statutorily defined terms could be misleading enough to
violate Zauderer's test.80

Other federal appellate courts agree. In a dispute about an
ordinance requiring cell phone sellers to disclose information to
consumers about radiofrequency emissions, the Ninth Circuit in
CTIA

The Wireless Ass 'n v. City & County of San Francisco held

that while the "factoids" required to be disclosed were all "literally
true" in that they had some scientific basis, their overall meaning was
misleading by omission." Among other concerns, the court noted that
the word "risk" was "being used ...in a way different from the usual
way"; that the "overall impression" left by the required disclosures
was "that cell phones are dangerous and that they have somehow
escaped the regulatory process"; and that the classification of a
"possible carcinogen" will be misunderstood by the "uninitiated ...
as more dangerous than it really is." 82 Additional support for this
interpretation comes from the Supreme Court's own language in
Milavetz, which considered the possibility that the phrase "debt relief
agency" might be "misleading," "confusing," or likely to be
misunderstood as relevant to the question of whether the disclosure
79. Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 39, at 905-06. See also Daniel E.
Herz-Roiphe, Stubborn Things: An Empirical Approach to Facts, Opinions, and the First
Amendment, 113 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 47 (2015) (empirical study of whether

consumers believed the statements mandated in cases like Am. Meat Inst., NAM, United Foods,
Arnold, and RJ Reynolds constituted pure fact or "some opinion").
80. Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs., 800 F.3d at 540 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting) ("None of this is to
grant the government carte blanche to compel commercial speakers to voice any prescribed set
of words as long as the words are defined by statute or regulation. Zauderer does not grant the
government that kind of license. The government, for instance, could not misleadingly redefine

'peace' as 'war,' and then compel a factual statement using the term 'peace' on the theory that a
consumer could consult the govermment's redefinition to learn that 'peace' in fact means 'war'
in the specific circumstances ... A consumer would have no reason to suppose that the word
'peace' is a stylized term of art misleadingly redefined to be something far different from its
ordinary meaning.").
81. CTIA-The Wireless Ass'n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 827 F. Supp. 2d 1054,
1060-62 (9th Cir. 2012).
82. Id. at 1062-63.
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law was reasonably related to the state's interest, as required by
Zauderer.83

In the context of reproductive care, however, lower courts have
taken a different approach. These courts instead suggest that words or
phrases likely to be misinterpreted by patients to have a moral or
metaphysical meaning (like the phrase "human being") are not
constitutionally problematic as long as they have a factually based
statutory definition.8 4 In South Dakota, for example, a statute
required physicians to advise patients seeking an abortion that "the
abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living
human being., 8 5 The statute defined the term "human being" as
"individual living member of the species of Homo sapiens, including
the unborn human being during the entire embryonic and fetal ages
from fertilization to full gestation., 8 6 At issue was whether the
required disclosure was scientifically and factually accurate. The
Eighth Circuit in Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota,

South Dakota v. Rounds upheld the disclosure, stating that "the
truthfulness and relevance of the [human being] disclosure...
generates little dispute" because it is based on a biological
definition.8 7 While acknowledging that "[t]aken in isolation," the
human being disclosure "certainly may be read to make a point in the
debate about the ethics of abortion," the court held that in conjunction
with the statutory definition of "human being," the disclosure
satisfied constitutional scrutiny.88
83. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 250-53 (2010).
Note, however, that the Court did not consider the question of whether the required disclosures
were "factual and uncontroversial" under Zauderer.
84. While the cases described below analyzed the meaning of the mandated disclosures by
reference to whether they were "truthful" and "not misleading" under the Casey standard, rather
than "factual and uncontroversial" under the Zauderer standard, their reasoning would apply in
both contexts.
85. S.D. CODIIEDLAws § 34-23A-10.1(1)(b)(2014).
86. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-1(4) (2006).

87. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 735-36 (8th Cir.
2008).
88. Id. The dissenting opinion in Rounds, however, vigorously objected to this conclusion.
Although a legislature may choose to give words its own unique definition, it cannot
establish by fiat that the term "human being" has only biological connotations, for the
constitutional analysis of whether the mandated statements convey factual truths or
contestable ideology is not controlled by the wording of the Act.
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The District Court for the Southern District of Indiana reached a
similar conclusion in Planned Parenthood of Indiana, Inc. v.
Commissioner of Indiana State Department of Health, a challenge to
an Indiana statute requiring physicians to inform women seeking
abortions that "human physical life begins when a human ovum is
fertilized by a human spenm. 8 9 Unlike in Rounds, the phrase "human
physical life" was not statutorily defined; thus the court turned to the
words' plain meaning. 90 The court described as "significant" the
inclusion of "the biology-based word 'physical"' and concluded that
the mandated statement did not require physicians to address
"whether the embryo or fetus is a 'human life' in the metaphysical
sense. "91

C. Omissions and One-Sided Disclosures
A third relevant question that some courts have considered is
whether accurate factual information might nevertheless violate the
"factual and uncontroversial" requirement if it is too one-sided, or
omits other relevant information necessary to give context. However,
there is little consensus on this issue. In American Meat Institute, for
example, the court ultimately upheld country-of-origin labeling
requirements as being "uncontroversial," but recognized that "some
required factual disclosures could be so one-sided or incomplete that
they would not qualify as 'factual and uncontroversial"' under
Zauderer.92 The Northern District of California in CTIA likewise
understood that some disclosures might fail the Zauderer test if they

Id. at 744 (Murphy, J., dissenting). See also Eubanks v. Brown, 604 F. Supp. 141 (W.D. Ky.

1984), a pre-Casey case considering a Kentucky statute defining "human being" as "any
member of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until death." The court in Eubanks found
this definitional provision unconstitutional on the grounds that it "incorporate[s] into the law a
definition of life as beginning at fertilization, a theory which the Supreme Court ... has held

may not be used by a state in a statute to justify its regulation of abortion." Id. at 144.
89. Planned Parenthood of Ind.,
Inc. v. Comm'r of Ind. State Dep't of Health, 794 F.
Supp. 2d 892, 914 (S.D. Ind. 2011), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part sub nom. Planned Parenthood of
Ind.,
Inc. v. Comm'r of Ind. State Dep't of Health, 699 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 2012).
90. Id. at 917.
91. Id. at918.
92. Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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were "misleading by omission."93 In contrast, in a case challenging
the FDA's graphic tobacco labeling regulations, the Sixth Circuit in
Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States held that
although the labeling requirements were "inherently persuasive" and
not "neutral," they did in fact describe "the incontestable health
consequences of using tobacco"
and were therefore appropriate for
94
analysis under Zauderer.
In summary, there appears to be wide variation in how lower
courts approach the issue of what constitutes "factual and
uncontroversial" speech under Zauderer. The only firm conclusion
that can be reached is that mandated disclosures of subjective
opinions do not qualify as "factual" information under Zauderer. A
somewhat more tentative conclusion is that compelled statements of
factually undisputed information are unlikely to run afoul of
Zauderer simply because that information deals with topics of public
debate or controversy. However, greater uncertainty remains as to
whether language whose plain meaning differs from its statutory
definition, or information that is one-sided, fails the factual and
uncontroversial test.
FICTION: IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT, THE STATE MAY COMPEL
PHYSICIANS TO SPEAK ON IDEOLOGICAL ISSUES.
FACT: EVEN IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT, COMPELLED
IDEOLOGICAL SPEECH IS SUBJECT TO STRICT SCRUTINY.
OPEN QUESTION: WHAT QUALIFIES AS IDEOLOGICAL SPEECH?

In Summit Medical Center of Alabama, Inc. v. Riley, physicians
raised a First Amendment challenge to a statute requiring them to
provide patients seeking abortions with "ideologically objectionable"
written materials promoting childbirth over abortion. 95 The District
Court for the Middle District of Alabama squarely rejected the
physicians' First Amendment claims, dismissing them as being

93. CTIA-The Wireless Ass'n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 827 F. Supp. 2d 1054,
1062 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
94. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 526-37 (6th Cir.

2012).
95.

2003).

Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Riley, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1271 (M.D. Ala.
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precluded by Casey.9 6 According to the court, the Supreme Court in
Casey "expressly rejected the notion that a state may require
distribution
only of ideologically neutral information regarding
9
abortion." 7
The District Court's conclusion in Summit flies in the face of
decades of First Amendment jurisprudence, which consistently holds
that state mandates of ideological speech are subject to the strictest
level of scrutiny and are unlikely to ever pass constitutional muster.98
This doctrinal conclusion is no different when the ideological speech
is being compelled in the physicians' office as part of informed
consent to abortion, and Casey does not so hold.
As explained earlier, Casey's discussion of the constitutional
standard applicable to compelled physician speech was incomplete at
best. The Court's only mention of potential ideological issues was in
its discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment implications of the
informed consent law; it held that the state may enact laws "designed
to encourage [a woman] to know that there are philosophic and social
arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of
continuing the pregnancy to full term ..... ,9 But in its discussion of
the First Amendment implications of the Pennsylvania informed
consent statute, the Court did not use the term "ideological" in
describing these state preferences, did not reach a conclusion as to
whether they were "ideological" for constitutional purposes under the

96. Id.
97.

Id. at 1270.

98. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) ("[W]here the State's interest
is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh

an individual's First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such message."); W.
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any fixed star in
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an

exception, they do not now occur to us."). See also Corbin, supra note 73, at 1287 (explaining
that mandates of ideological speech are treated with greater suspicion than mandates of factual
speech); Nicole B. Casarez, Don't Tell Me What to Say: Compelled Speech and the First
Amendment, 63 Mo. L. REV. 929, 948 (1998) ("The fact that the First Amendment prohibits the
state from compelling speech of a religious, political, or ideological nature has been determined

beyond question.").
99.

Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992).
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precedent in Wooley v. Maynard,00 and did not discuss the
constitutional implications of ideological speech mandates in the
professional context.
Notably, the Third Circuit below had held that while the

Pennsylvania informed consent statute did not compel ideological
speech, if it had, it would have been subject to a higher standard of
scrutiny. m But the Supreme Court itself did not address this issue on
appeal, declining to provide further analysis of whether compelling
physicians to speak ideological messages would be subject to the
same level of First Amendment scrutiny as the ideological speech in
Wooley. As Jennifer Keighley writes, "[w]hile the joint opinion's
undue burden analysis makes clear that the information in the state
pamphlet was designed to encourage women to choose childbirth
over abortion, [it] never addresses how the state's ideological
purpose, though permissible under the undue burden framework,
interacted with physicians' First Amendment rights. 10 2 Thus, Casey
should not be interpreted as permitting compelled ideological speech
in the informed consent process.103

100. Id. at 884 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. at 713 (applying strict scrutiny)).
Wooley v. Maynard involved a First Amendment challenge to a New Hampshire law making it
a crime to obscure the words "Live Free or Die" on state license plates. Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705. The Supreme Court found the law unconstitutional, holding that "where the
State's interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest
cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such
message." Id. at 706-07.
101. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 705-06 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd in
part,rev 'd in part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (noting that under Zauderer,"[d]isclosure requirements
are permissible so long as they are not a state attempt to prescribe what is 'orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein,"' and concluding that none of the Pennsylvania informed consent
requirements have this intent or effect).
102. Keighley, supra note 12, at 2356.
103. Id. at 2356; Robbins, supra note 48, at 175 (noting that the parts of Akron and
Thornnburg that address the constitutional implications of compelled ideological speech in the
abortion context should still be considered good law); Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585,
588 (M.D.N.C. 2014) aff'd sub nom. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014) ("The
Supreme Court has never held that a state has the power to compel a health care provider to
speak, in his or her own voice, the state's ideological message in favor of carrying a pregnancy
to term ....");Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 734-35 (8th
Cir. 2008) ("Casey and Gonzales establish that, while the State cannot compel an individual
simply to speak the State's ideological message, it can use its regulatory authority to require a
physician to provide truthful, non-misleading information relevant to a patient's decision to
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There are a few ways to explain the Supreme Court's silence in
Casey about the First Amendment implications of ideological
communications in the informed consent process. First, as recognized
by Keighley, 1°4 the Pennsylvania informed consent law did not
require physicians to convey the state's pro-childbirth message in
their own words; it merely required physicians to offer patients the
opportunity to receive this message as presented in a state
pamphlet.10 5 It is possible that the Court in Casey did not consider the
requirement that physicians offer patients a state pamphlet to be
compulsion to the same degree as Wooley's requirement that private
automobiles display a state message on their license plate.
Alternatively, perhaps the Court, despite referring to the state's
motive of exposing women to "philosophic and social arguments of
great weight" regarding abortion, agreed with the Third Circuit's
assessment that the disclosures required by Pennsylvania were not
ideological in nature (and so not subject to strict scrutiny under
Wooley). 10 6 Or perhaps the Court simply blundered by referencing the
philosophical nature of the state's message in its due process analysis
while neglecting to address this consideration in its free speech
analysis.
In any event, it seems clear that the Supreme Court's holding in
Casey cannot be read to support the conclusion that compelling
physicians to make ideological statements in the informed consent
context should be held to a different level of scrutiny than compelled

have an abortion, even if that information might also encourage the patient to choose childbirth

over abortion.").
104. Keighley, supra note 12, at 2353.
105. The Pennsylvania law required physicians to provide patients directly with
information about the nature of the abortion procedure, the health risks of the abortion and of
childbirth, and the probable gestational age of the fetus. Physicians were also required to make
patients aware of the availability of state-published materials "describing the fetus and
providing information about medical assistance for childbirth, information about child support
from the father, and a list of agencies which provide adoption and other services as alternatives
to abortion." Casey, 505 U.S. at 881.
106. See Casey, 947 F.2d at 705 (noting that the information required by Pennsylvania law

"is not an attempt to prescribe an orthodoxy in matters of opinion"). See also Tex. Med.
Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 2012)
(distinguishing between factual and ideological statements, and noting that the abortion

informed consent requirements in question "do not fall under the rubric of compelling
'ideological' speech that triggers First Amendment strict scrutiny").
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ideological speech in any other contexts. Other Supreme Court
opinions dealing with professional speech mandates support this
interpretation. Just two years prior to Casey, for example, the Court
in Keller v. State Bar of Californiaheld that the use of bar dues to

finance "ideological or political activities to which [attorneys] were
opposed" violated their free speech rights. 107 In so holding, it set forth
a rule that while the bar may fund activities relevant to the goals of
"regulating legal profession or improving quality of legal services," it
may not "fund activities of an ideological nature which fall outside of
those areas of activity."108 Similarly, in Zauderer, the Court upheld
an Ohio law requiring that attorney advertisements include
information about how contingent-fee rates are calculated, noting that
unlike in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the
Ohio law did not "attempt[] to 'prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion
or force
10 9
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."
Indeed, the Court has applied strict scrutiny to mandates of even
purely factual speech in some commercial contexts, where that
commercial speech is intertwined with fully protected speech, such as
speech designed to advocate or inform.110 Given that a mandate of

107. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 4 (1990).
108. Id. at 13-14. While recognizing that the line between ideological and non-ideological
speech is unclear, the Court found such a violation in Keller.
But the extreme ends of the spectrum are clear: Compulsory dues may not be
expended to endorse or advance a gun control or nuclear weapons freeze initiative; at
the other end of the spectrum petitioners have no valid constitutional objection to their
compulsory dues being spent for activities connected with disciplining members of the
Bar or proposing ethical codes for the profession.
Id. at 15-16. The Court did not specify the level of constitutional scrutiny that would apply to
compulsory bar dues funding ideological speech unrelated to the regulation of the legal
profession; it merely concluded that they would be per se unconstitutional. Id.
109. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
651 (1985) (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). See also
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457, 469-70 (1997) (declining to apply strict
scrutiny to laws requiring fruit growers to pay assessments for generic fruit advertising, on the
grounds that the laws "do not compel the producers to endorse or to finance any political or
ideological views").
110. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (holding
unconstitutional, under "exacting First Amendment scrutiny," a law requiring that professional
fundraisers disclose to potential donors the average percentage of gross receipts actually turned
over to charities within the previous twelve months). Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities
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ideological speech as part of the informed consent process
necessarily goes beyond proposing a purely commercial transaction
or engaging in professional practice, it would likewise be subject to
strict scrutiny.
Thus, the best reading of the Supreme Court's compelled speech
jurisprudence is that compelled ideological statements in the context
of professional practice would be subject to strict scrutiny, just as in
private contexts.111 Were a state to adopt an informed consent law
requiring physicians to make ideological statements to their patients,
Supreme Court precedent suggests that the law would be upheld only
if it were designed to achieve a compelling state interest and were
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Casey's silence on the issue
does not change this conclusion.1 1 2 Indeed, many lower courts
addressing the issue of compelled ideological speech in commercial
and professional contexts have concluded that such speech mandates
must be analyzed using a heightened (though not always strict) level
of scrutiny. 11

Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding that a newsletter "receives the full protection of
the First Amendment" where its contents "range from energy-saving tips to stories about
wildlife conservation," address "matters of public concern," and "extend well beyond speech
that proposes a business transaction").
111. For a thoughtful analysis of both the normative and descriptive arguments in support
of conclusion, see Keighley, supra note 12.
112. See, e.g., Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 249 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nora.
Walker-McGill v. Stuart, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015) ("The single paragraph in Casey does not
assert that physicians forfeit their First Amendment rights in the procedures surrounding
abortions, nor does it announce the proper level of scrutiny to be applied to abortion regulations
that compel speech to the extraordinary extent present here.").
113. See, e.g., Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d
942 (W.D. Tex. 2011), vacated in part 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012) (applying strict scrutiny to
an abortion informed consent law that required physicians to "say things and take expressive
actions with which the physician may not ideologically agree, and which the physician may feel
are medically unnecessary," because such speech was "inextricably intertwined with
noncommercial speech"); Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (upholding district court's use of
Sorrell intermediate test for commercial speech, rather than strict scrutiny, for compulsions of
ideological speech in the abortion context); Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 599-600
(M.D.N.C.), aff'd sub nom. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, cert. denied sub nora. Walker-

McGill v. Stuart, 135 S.Ct. 2838 (recognizing that "the state's express ideological interest" is
relevant to the decision about the level of scrutiny to apply, ultimately applying heightened
scrutiny as established by Sorrell to speech it described as "obviously not commercial" but
requiring physicians to make statements "outside [the] prevailing practices" of medicine);
CTIA-The Wireless Ass'nv. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 827 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1059 (N.D.
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Given this doctrinal conclusion, however, there remains
significant uncertainty as to what, precisely, qualifies as "ideological
speech" for the purpose of the First Amendment. 114 The application
of strict scrutiny to compulsions of ideological speech originated in
Wooley, where the Court held unconstitutional a New Hampshire law
making it a crime to obscure the words "Live Free or Die" on state
license plates. 1 5 The Court described the law as one which "forces an
individual, as part of his daily life.., to be an instrument for
fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds
unacceptable." '1 6 It held that the message communicated by the
license plate was not "ideologically neutral" because it was intended
by the state as being "an official view as to proper appreciation of
history, state pride, and individualism. 1 1
Lower courts have struggled with how to apply this precedent,
particularly in the context of abortion informed consent laws. Just as
courts have taken a variety of approaches in interpreting the "factual
and uncontroversial" requirement, their interpretation of what counts
as "ideological" speech likewise varies. The Fourth Circuit in Stuart
v. Camnitz, for example, held that a North Carolina statute that
requires physicians to perform an ultrasound, display the sonogram,
and describe the fetus to women seeking abortions constitutes
ideological speech prohibited under the First Amendment. 8 In its
opinion, the court wrote that although the words the physician must
speak are "factual," the context of the speech demonstrates the
words' "moral or ideological implications."1 9 According to the court,
the ultrasound requirement is intended to communicate "a particular
Cal. 2011) ("Mandatory disclosures by businesses of government opinions and viewpoints
...are subject to more exacting scrutiny.").
114. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990).
115. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 706-07 (1977) (holding that "where the State's
interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot

outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such
message").
116. Id. at715.

117. Id. at 717. Cf Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457, 469-70 (1997)
(holding that assessments to pay for generic advertising for advertising of California nectarines,
plums, and peaches "do not compel [fruit] produces to endorse or to finance any political or
ideological views.").
118. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 242.
119. Id. at246.
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opinion," and "explicitly promotes a pro-life message by demanding
the provision of facts that all fall on one side of the abortion debateand does so shortly before the time of decision when the intended
recipient is most vulnerable." 120 This holding seems consistent with
Wooley's concern about compelling someone to speak an "official
view as to proper appreciation" of certain values.
However, the Fifth Circuit, considering a similar ultrasound law,
disagreed, focusing less on the context of the speech and more on the
specific words used. In a footnote, the court noted that "ideological
speech" as considered by Wooley is speech that "conveys a 'point of
view"' rather than communicates "factual information., 121 The
ultrasound law, according to the court, did not satisfy this test.
Though there may be questions at the margins, surely a
photograph and description of its features constitute the purest
conceivable expression of "factual information." If the
sonogram changes a woman's mind about whether to have an
abortion.... that is a function of the combination of her new
knowledge and her own "ideology" ("values" is a better term),
not of any "ideology"122inherent in the information she has
learned about the fetus.
Unlike the Fourth Circuit, it analyzed the ideological nature of the
statement solely by reference to the words stated, rather than the
contextual understanding of those words.
The Eighth Circuit in Rounds similarly rejected a First
Amendment challenge to another abortion informed consent law that
petitioners argued compelled ideological speech. The South Dakota
law at issue required physicians to tell a patient seeking an abortion
that "she has an existing relationship" with an unborn human being
that "enjoys protection under the United States Constitution and
under the laws of South Dakota" and that "by having an abortion, her
existing relationship and her existing constitutional rights with

120. Id.
121. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577 n.4 (5th
Cir. 2012).
122. Id.
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regards to that relationship will be terminated., 123 Planned
Parenthood argued that this law compelled ideological speech
because the speech carried inherent "moral and philosophical
messages" that could be read to "make a point in the debate about the
ethics of abortion."1 24 The Eighth Circuit, however, did not explicitly

address the First Amendment implications of Planned Parenthood's
claims about the ideological nature of the compelled speech; it
merely concluded1 25
that the speech mandate did not violate Casey's
undue burden test.
Much like the question of what constitutes "factual and
uncontroversial" speech, the question of what constitutes
"ideological" speech is an open one. The greatest uncertainty arises
when states require communication of factual information for
ideological purposes, when the information presented is one-sided in
order to emphasize the state's preferred perspective, or when the
factual information presented could reasonably be understood to have
ideological implications or underpinnings. Courts addressing
compelled speech challenges to informed consent laws will continue
to struggle with this undetermined doctrine.
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123. Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662, 668 (8th Cir. 2011), vacated in
part on reh 'g en banc sub nom. by Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 662 F.3d
1072 (8th Cir. 2011) and on reh'g en banc in part sub nom. by Planned Parenthood Minn.,
N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012).
124. Id. at 669.
125.

Id.
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MESSAGE RENDER AN OTHERWISE CONSTITUTIONAL SPEECH
MANDATE UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

Defenders of compelled speech mandates often argue that such
mandates are not unconstitutional as long as the objecting speaker has
an opportunity to disassociate from the compelled speech or issue his
own response. In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities
Commission of California,for example, the California Public Utilities
Commission defended a rule requiring utility companies to include
third-party newsletters in their billing envelopes by arguing that the
third-party access requirement did not limit a utility's speech or
126
prohibit it from expressing its own message in response.
The appellants, however, argued that because the rule required
them to provide access "only to those who disagree with [their] views
and who are hostile to [their] interests," it would necessarily embroil
them in a "controversy" they would rather avoid by forcing them to
respond to the third party's hostile message. 127 The Court agreed,
holding that a utility's ability to respond was not enough to protect
12
the compelled speech law from First Amendment scrutiny. 1
"[T]here can be little doubt that appellant will feel compelled to
respond to arguments and allegations made by [the third party]," the
Court held, and such a "forced response is antithetical to the free
discussion that the First Amendment seeks to foster. 1 29 It concluded
that "the danger that appellant will be required to alter its own
message as a consequence of the government's coercive action is a
proper object of First Amendment solicitude," and that strict scrutiny
would therefore apply. 30

126. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 4, 6 (1986).
127.
128.

Id. at 14.
Id. at 15-16.

129. Id. at 16 ("Were the government freely able to compel corporate speakers to propound
political messages with which they disagree, this protection would be empty, for the
government could require speakers to affirm in one breath that which they deny in the next.").
Cf PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (holding that shopping mall

owners' First Amendment rights were not violated in part because the views of the speakers on
the owners' property were not likely to be identified with those of the owner, and noting that
the mall owners "are free to publicly disassociate themselves" from the views of speakers on
their property).
130. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 16.
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The reasoning in Pacific Gas would likely apply equally in the
context of physician speech mandates. If a state law compelling
physicians to speak failed the Zauderer requirement of being purely
factual and uncontroversial and rationally related to professional
regulation, it could not be saved by the argument that physicians are
permitted to disassociate themselves from or express disagreement
with the message. Where a physician is required by law to
communicate information with which he disagrees, he "may be
forced either to appear to agree with [the compelled
speech] or to
131
respond," even if he would prefer not to speak.
The Eighth Circuit in Rounds recognized this point in 2006 when
it upheld a district court's preliminary injunction against South
Dakota's abortion informed consent law,132 which required
physicians to state that abortion "will terminate the life of a whole,
separate, unique, living human being."' 33 The state had defended this
law on the grounds that physicians were permitted to "disassociate
themselves" from the message if they found it objectionable.1 34 The
court, however, concluded that the ability to disassociate oneself
from an ideological message does not cure the constitutional
infirmity, citing Pacific Gas for the proposition that "the injury which
results from forcing an abortion provider to recite the state's
ideological objections to abortion would not be eliminated by simply
allowing her to add her own views.
This opinion was later
vacated, however, and in 2008 the Eighth Circuit vacated the
preliminary injunction on the grounds that the "human being"
disclosure was a "truthful and non-misleading" statement. 136 The
court declined to reach a decision on whether and when the ability to

131. Id. See also Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457, 470-71 (1997)
(citing Pacific Gas as standing for the proposition that the First Amendment prohibits forcing

speakers "to respond to a hostile message when they 'would prefer to remain silent').
132. Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 467 F.3d 716, 725 (8th Cir. 2006), rehg en
bane granted, opinion vacated (8th Cir. 2007).
133. Id. at719.
134. Id. at 725.

135. Id. The court noted, however, that the physician's ability to disassociate himself from
the state's message might be constitutionally relevant if the mandated speech were not
ideological-that is, if it were "generally neutral and accurate," but "misleading as applied to a
specific patient." Id.
136. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 736-37 (8th Cir.
2008).
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disassociate might constitutionally relevant, because it concluded that
the South Dakota statute did not mandate any ideological speech
from which disassociation was necessary. 13 A dissenting opinion,
however, restated the point made in the 2006 opinion, again citing
Pacific Gas for the proposition that "[e]ven if the physician were able
to disclaim sponsorship of the state's message, the constitutional
defects inherent in compelled ideological speech would not be
cured. ,138

The Second Circuit recognized this point as well in Evergreen, a
constitutional challenge to crisis pregnancy center speech
mandates. 139 While compelling the speech of non-profit organizations
rather than medical professionals, the court, citing Riley v. National
Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., expressed concern

that mandating disclosure of whether the centers provide abortion,
emergency contraception, or prenatal care services "will change the
way in which a pregnancy services center, if it so chooses, discusses
[these controversial issues]." 140 Because "[t]he centers must be free to
formulate their own address," the court found the disclosure
unconstitutional. 141
Thus, a speaker's ability to dissociate himself from a statemandated message by expressing disagreement with it will not save
an otherwise unconstitutional statute. But what about the opposite

scenario? Imagine a state informed consent law that satisfies all of
the relevant constitutional tests described above-it compels
137. Id. at 737. In dicta, however, the court suggested that "the state could argue" that the
ability to disassociate is constitutionally relevant when the compelled speech is ideological in
nature. Id. at 736.
138. Id. at 746 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
139. Evergreen Ass'n, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 740 F.3d 233, 249-50 (2d Cir. 2014), cert.
denied sub nom. Evergreen Ass'n, Inc. v. City of N.Y., N.Y., 135 S. Ct. 435 (2014), and
Pregnancy Care Ctr. of N.Y. v. City of N.Y., N.Y., 135 S. Ct. 435 (2014).
140. Evergreen, 740 F.3d at 249-50; Riley v.Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc.,
487
U.S. 781 (1988). As in Riley, the Second Circuit in Evergreen applied the strictest scrutiny to
the New York speech mandate on the grounds that the crisis pregnancy centers were engaged in
both commercial and non-commercial speech.
141. Evergreen, 740 F.3d at 249-50. Note that while the "Services Disclosure" appears to
require disclosure of purely factual information (whether the center provides certain medical
services), the Second Circuit ultimately interpreted the Services Disclosure as a "mandated
discussion of controversial political topics." Id. at 250. See supra text accompanying notes 6566.
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physicians to communicate information that is rationally related to
the practice of medicine, factual and uncontroversial, and nonideological. Could a physician nevertheless make the case that the
law is unconstitutional if it is not clear that the physician's speech is
being controlled by the state? Numerous commentators have made
this type of argument, claiming that additional constitutional
concerns arise when the state "commandeers" 142 physicians to act as
144
'
"mouthpieces ,4 or puppets,, for the state's message. 145
There is indeed something in the Supreme Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence to support the point that listeners'
confusion about the source of speech may implicate its
constitutionality. In many compelled speech cases, the Court has
carefully analyzed whether the speech is likely to be perceived by
listeners as being controlled by the speaker, as opposed to by the state
or a third party. In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and
Bisexual Group of Boston, for example, a group of LGBT individuals
of Irish descent brought suit against the organizers of a St. Patrick's
Day parade who refused to let them march. 14 6 In analyzing whether
the requiring the organizers to include the LGBT group would violate
the organizers' First Amendment rights, the Court considered the
difference between speakers who are viewed as "conduits" for the
speech of others, and those who are viewed as autonomous speakers
themselves.1 4 It noted that the LGBT group's participation in the
parade "would likely be perceived as having resulted from [the
organizers'] determination ... that its message was worthy of

142.
143.

Keighley, supra note 12, at 2381.
Gregory D. Curfman et al., Physicians and the FirstAmendment, 359 NEw ENG. J.

MED. 2484 (2008).
144.
145.

Robbins, supra note 48.
Haupt, supra note 12, at 1257 (arguing that constitutional norms may be violated

when a state "demands that physicians communicate certain claims to their patients in materials
of [their] own design [to] effectively tr[y] to obscure authorship even though it is the state that

retains effective control over the content of the message."); Helen Norton, The Measure of
Government Speech: Identifying Expression'sSource, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587 (2008) [hereinafter
Norton, The Measure of Government Speech] (in the context of government speech doctrine,
noting the constitutional importance of establishing, both formally and functionally, when
speech is coming from the state or a third
party).
146. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
147. Id. at 575-77.
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presentation and quite possibly of support as well., 14 The Court
contrasted this with speakers like cable broadcasters and shopping
mall owners who, despite acting as hosts for third-party speech, likely
would not be perceived as supporting those third-party messages. 149 It
concluded that where "a speaker intimately connected with the
communication advanced" is compelled to speak, where the
communication is "perceived by" listeners to be part of a speaker's
message or otherwise identified with the speaker, "the speaker's right
to autonomy over the message is compromised., 150 Two years later,
in Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed this idea, summarizing its prior compelled speech
jurisprudence as holding that constitutional concerns arise when the
state requires speakers to "repeat an objectionable message out of
their own mouths... use their own property to convey an
antagonistic ideological message ... force them to respond to a
hostile message when they 'would prefer to remain silent' . . . or
require them to be publicly identified or associated with another's
,,151
message.
Where informed consent mandates require physicians to
communicate messages dictated by the state, there is a substantial
risk that patient-listeners will not recognize the true origins of the
speech. 152 As recognized by a dissenting opinion in Rounds,
communications by physicians to patients "are, if anything, more
likely to be attributed to the speaker than the well known slogan
affixed to a state issued license plate in Wooley or the forced
publication of third party speech in Pacific Gas," because the context
in which the statements are made is one "in which patients expect
doctors to use their best and honest judgment. , 15 ' Robert Post notes
that compelled commercial speech such as government-mandated

148.
Gas).
149.

Id. at 575 (analogizing to newspapers with editorial control, and the utilities in Pacific
Id. at 576-77.

150. Id. at 576-80.
151. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457, 470-71 (1997).
152. Note, however, that some informed consent mandates clearly identify the source of the
disclosed information, as in the case of laws requiring physicians to direct patients seeking
abortions to state brochures or state websites for additional information.
153. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 747 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting).
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labels and reports generally "do ...not pose a problem of stealth or

ventriloquism," because it is obvious to consumers that the disclosure
is coming from the state. 154 But when patients discuss the risks and
benefits of proposed medical procedures with their physicians as part
of the informed consent process, they are relying on their physicians'
medical expertise and do not anticipate that the statements their
physicians are communicating are not the physicians' own.
Moreover, unlike in cases such as Hurley, PruneYard,Rumsfeld, and

others, the objectionable message is being communicated directly by
the physician-speaker, rather than the physician simply offering a
forum for others to speak. Indeed, anecdotal evidence supports the
fact that many health care providers subject to objectionable
informed consent laws take great pains to disassociate themselves
from state-mandated messages.155
Lack of clarity about the source of the message is problematic, in
part, because it may lead patients to overestimate the persuasiveness
and credibility of the message. 156 "Because health professionals may
be seen as more credible than the government in this setting based on
public perception of their expertise and objectivity, patients may have

154. Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 39, at 918.
155. One pre-abortion ultrasound informed consent form from a Texas physician, currently
circulating on various internet forums, includes the following language:
The Texas legislature, in its infinite wisdom, believes that neither you nor I are
intelligent enough to carry on a conversation about how you might make an informed
decision about how best to handle your current pregnancy. To be sure that they and
their ideologues are part of our doctor patient relationship, they have mandated that
you be forced to see and hear the ultrasound of your pregnancy, as well as be given a
detailed description of the pregnancy's development to this stage. By inserting
themselves into our conversation, they have almost certainly violated our first
amendment rights to free speech and intruded into the time-honored relationship you
and I share at this critical time in our lives. It is, however, the current state law in
Texas.
Cory Doctorow, Texas Doctor's Consent Form for Women Seeking Abortions,
BOINGBOING.NET (Aug. 28, 2015), https://boingboing.net/2015/08/28/texas-doctors-consentform-f.html?fk bb.
156. Norton, The Measure of Government Speech, supra note 145, at 595-97 (citing Gia
Lee and Lawrence Lessig's research, noting that messages that appear to be influenced by the
government or other powerful groups may be less effective than those communicated by actors
perceived to be more independent); Corbin, supra note 73, at 1329 ("To start, confusion about
who is speaking could cause the listener to overestimate the popularity of the government's
message, thereby increasing its persuasiveness. In addition, the distortion may be magnified due
to the tendency to defer to respected authority figures such as doctors.").
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been misled into evaluating the counseling differently than they
would have if the speakers had made clear the governmental
source." 157 Indeed, governments may choose to communicate their
messages by way of private or professional speakers with the clear
158
goal of taking advantage of the speakers' perceived independence.
Thus, the analysis might be different in cases where the source of
the physician-communicated message is made obvious, or where the
message is not communicated directly by the physician as speakerfor example, where a physician is merely required to present the
59
patient with a state brochure, or direct the patient to a state website.1
Informed consent mandates that include obvious statements or other
cues informing the patient that the information communicated is
required by law and may not represent the physician's
professional
1 60
perspective are likely to be seen as preferable.
However, even messages that are clearly identified as statesponsored may be problematic when compelled in the specific
context of medical care. Many commentators have argued that the
intervention of a government message into a sphere that patients
expect to be a locus of professional independence may jeopardize the
trust inherent in the physician-patient relationship.
Robert Post
discusses this concern in the context of subsidized speech, noting that
while the state can traditionally compel viewpoint-based speech in
managerial domains, the physician's professional "obligation to make
independent medical judgments sets limits to the managerial
authority" of an employer who seeks to control the physician's
speech. 62 Under most circumstances, he writes, "patients expect the
independent judgment of their physicians to trump inconsistent

157.
158.

Norton, The Measure of Government Speech, supra note 145, at 629-30.
Id. at 595-96.

159. See Keighley, supra note 12, at 2377 ("A law that requires a physician to offer a state
pamphlet to her patients does not infringe the physician's constitutionally protected autonomy
interests because the physician herself is not required to adopt the state's ideological views, nor
to represent these views as her own.").
160. See Norton, The Measure of Government Speech, supra note 145, at 630-31
(discussing express cues for disassociation with a state-mandated message).
161. See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 48, at 192-93; Corbin, supra note 73, at 1329-30; Zick,
supra note 10, at 1353, 1355.
162. Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 171-74 (1996).
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managerial demands., 163 Thus, even if a physician's state-mandated
message is prefaced by a disclaimer about the source of the message,
such a disclaimer may, due the unique nature of the physician-patient
relationship, be inadequate to fully disassociate the physician from
the compelled speech in the patient's eyes.
Thus, one could make the argument that state laws that rely on
physicians as mouthpieces for the state's messages (even if those
messages are determined by a court to be factual and uncontroversial)
violate the First Amendment. However, there are two reasons why it
is unlikely that courts will adopt this line of reasoning. First, it is
doubtful that most courts would agree with the factual conclusion that
patients always consider physician speech to be the physician's own
medical judgments, even if that speech is prefaced with a disclaimer
or clearly identified as state-mandated. 64 Second, as a policy matter,
accepting this argument would broaden the scope of physicians' First
Amendment protection quite dramatically. If a physician's inability
to disassociate himself from state-mandated messages renders those
messages potentially unconstitutional, then even factual and
uncontroversial informed consent mandates would be at risk.
CONCLUSION

Most state informed consent laws are uncontroversial. Physicians
understand the necessity of providing patients with factual
information about their medical options. But when state legislatures
establish disclosure mandates that go beyond the common law
requirements of informed consent, that require disclosure of
inaccurate or one-sided information, or that mandate or prohibit
speech on controversial topics, physicians will object. Unfortunately,
because the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on compelled
professional speech is so limited, litigants have struggled to piece
together convincing constitutional arguments from commercial
163. Id. at 174.
164. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (in the limited context of physicians
practicing within Title X facilities, noting that "a doctor's silence with regard to abortion cannot
reasonably be thought to mislead a client into thinking that the doctor does not consider

abortion an appropriate option for her").
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speech contexts, Fourteenth Amendment contexts, and every area in
between.
While it is impossible to predict how the Supreme Court might
rule in a modern compelled physician speech case, this Article offers
a tentative framework by which the Court might analyze such a case
based on past rulings. In order to pass constitutional muster, a state
law compelling physician speech would have to be reasonably related
to the regulation of the medical profession and would have to compel
factual, uncontroversial, and non-ideological speech (although the
definitions of those terms are clearly ambiguous and offer much room
for interpretation). If the state speech mandate intersects with a
patient's Fourteenth Amendment rights to medical self-determination
or reproductive privacy, additional requirements will apply. And
finally, it is possible-though unlikely, given how broadly this would
expand physicians' First Amendment protections-that the Court
might consider even otherwise-permissible speech mandates
unconstitutional if patients are unable to distinguish between their
physicians' own messages and the messages that are mandated by
law.

